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Abstract 
This paper explores empirically the contribution of institutional holdings in capital structure decisions using firm 
level annual data for sample period from 2009-2013 of 19 non-financial firms listed on the Nigeria Stock 
Exchange. The study also examines the effect of board size on financial mix decisions and controlled for 
traditional determinants of capital structure which include firm size and profitability. The analysis reveals that 
board size and the control variables have positive and statistically significant effect on capital structure 
decisions. We also find that institutional shareholding complement leverage but it is not statistically significant. 
The results therefore suggest that board size, profitability and firms’ size are important variables to be looked at 
when determining optimum financing mix. Furthermore, the insignificant contribution of institutional 
shareholders to achieving optimum level of capital structure may emanate from the fact that the institutional base 
of the firms in the study are not strong enough to adequately monitor managerial inefficiencies. More so, these 
institutions may be handpicked and not independent institutions. Therefore, for institutional investors to have 
considerable effect in capital structure decisions they should be independent. 
Keywords:   Institutional shareholding, Board Size, Capital Structure, Profitability  
 
1. Introduction 
Capital structure which is defined as the choice of a firm’s long term financing mix is one of the most important 
decisions managers have to make that has a resounding impact on the firm’s profitability  and survival (Brealey 
et al. 2004). The motivation for capital structure management stems from the need to trim down the cost of 
capital in an attempt to maximize shareholder’s wealth. Nonetheless, researchers have failed to reach a 
consensus as to the level of capital structure at which the cost of capital will equate the benefits accrued to 
shareholders. 
Previous researches have recognized the influence of corporate governance mechanisms such as board 
size and institutional holdings on capital structure decisions (Berger et.al. 1997; Abor, (2007). Hasan & Butt, 
(2009)).  This is because these tools which entail processes and structures are set up to assuage agency, 
information asymmetry and tax issues. However, empirical literature does not provide conclusive evidence on 
the effect and relationship between the two variables. For instance, Ganiyu & Abiodun (2012); Abor et al (2008) 
and Agyei& Owusu (2014) find board size to have significant impact in determining adequate financing on one 
hand, Ajanthan (2013); Rehman et al. (2013) find no correlation whatsoever. 
More strikingly are Institutional investors, which are often regarded as the most influential set of 
investors. Their effect on agency costs, asymmetric information and taxes are proposed to alter the manner in 
which firms structure their capital. Hence, by taking up monitoring roles and threatening to exit, institutional 
investors lessen the conflicts that may occur between managers and shareholders (Admati& Pfleiderer (2009), 
and Levit (2012)). More so, by engaging in trading activities based on the information collected, institutions 
investors reduce information asymmetry problems usually connected with equity (Sias (2004)).  In addition, 
institutional investors as equity holders, have relative tax advantage over individual investors as such ease the 
burdens associated with tax.  
In spite of the fact that institutional investors aid in cushioning the problems mentioned above and as 
elucidated by many capital structure models, the impact institutional investors have on the capital structure of 
firms still remains evasive. As Institutional holdings and debt could be either complements on one hand or 
substitutes on the other (Michelay & Vincent, 2013).  For instance institutional shareholders attempt at 
controlling organizational inefficiencies by threatening to sell shares may be as efficient as committing managers 
to pledge funds to creditors (Jensen, 1986). Also, gathering of information by institutional shareholders and 
trading will produce information which may lead to fall in adverse selection costs of equity, as such firms may 
lean towards increasing equity financing in their capital structures.  
Although previous literature has failed to focus on the link between capital structure and institutional 
investors, the notion that institutions may affect corporate financial policy has not been totally overlooked. 
Studies in recent times has shown that institutional holders contribute significantly in payout policy (Grinstein 
and Michaely (2005)), executive compensation (Hartzell and Starks (2003)), CEO turnover (Huson, Parrino, and 
Starks (2001)), and corporate governance (Gillan and Starks (2000)). Moreover, the empirical literature 
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examining the effect of institutional shareholders and firms’ capital structure decisions are limited especially in 
Nigeria. Our paper contributes to this strand of literature by providing empirical evidence on the contribution of 
institutional investors to financing mix decisions amongst listed non-financial firms in Nigeria. This is an 
introduction to the study, the remainder of the paper is organized as follows; In Section two  a review of related 
theoretical and empirical literature of  institutional investors  and their impact on capital structure. In Section 
three the methodological framework is described with the constructions of several important variables. In the 
next section we present the findings from our empirical analysis and conclude the paper in section five. 
. 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Theoretical Framework  
In an attempt to investigate the effect of institutional holding on firms leverage, we briefly review the most 
relevant theories of capital structure which advocate that tax, information asymmetry and agency cost are the 
problems envisaged when determining financial mix decisions. We also discuss the general institutional holding 
characteristics which explain the effects of institutional investors when they interact with these frictions, as well 
as detailed implication of these interactions for firms’ financing mix decisions. To address the shortcomings of 
the debt irrelevance theory proposed by Modigiliani & Miller (1958) firms, several theories have been put 
forward which suggest that taxes, information asymmetry and agency costs are the major frictions that facilitate 
the selection of an optimal level of capital structure capable of affecting firm value.  These theories can be 
classified into two groups; the tax based theories and the non-tax based theories (Kajananthan, 2012).   
The tax based theorists who include the trade-off theorist predicts that target debt ratio will differ from 
firm to firm. Hence, companies with safe tangible assets and ample taxable income to protect themselves in cases 
of financial distress should have higher debt ratio while unprofitable companies with risky intangible assets 
should seek for more sources of financing through equity. But less profitable firms do not have the shield against 
tax as such need to borrow more. Hence the theorists predict that managers will try to increase debt levels to a 
point where the value of an additional interest tax shield is exactly offset by the additional cost of financial 
distress (Brealey, et al.2004). Nevertheless, institutional investors generally have a relative tax advantage over 
individual investors as many institutions have tax exemptions, while several others pay taxes based on a small 
portion of the dividends they receive from their investments. Therefore, all things being equal, the more 
institutional holders in a firm, the more equity shares they issue.  
The pecking order theory also referred to as the asymmetry information model on other hand proffers 
explanation as to why profitable companies borrow less. It is based on asymmetric information as managers are 
more knowledgeable about the prospects and profitability of the firm than external investors. Hence investors 
may be unable to assess the true value of the firm when securities are issued. If managers know more than 
outside investors, they may be tempted to time stock issues when their companies stock is overpriced while 
optimistic managers will view their companies’ shares as underpriced and decide not to issue. All these problems 
are mitigated if the firm chooses to finance through earnings retained and reinvested. However, if external 
financing is necessary, firms will issue debts first and issue equity as the last resort (Zurigat, 2009; Ebadi et al., 
2011). The theory therefore posits that more profitable firms borrow less because they do not need outside 
money and that less profitable firms issue debt because they do not have enough inside funds for their capital 
investments (Ahmad et al, 2012). Azhagaiah and Govoury (2011) buttress further that equity financing is the 
most expensive and dangerous source of financing in terms of potential loss of control of the firm by its original 
owners. Institutional holdings however, are used to curtail the issue of information asymmetry because they 
dedicate substantial resources to collecting information. Many institutions are subject to federal fiduciary and 
prudential standards urging them to collect information about the firms they invest in in order to lessen the 
chances of being sued for violating these standards (Michaely &Vincent, 2013). As a result of these processes, 
institutional investors are armed with more information than other types of investors. More so, adverse selection 
costs of equity is affected because it reduces the gap in the information outside and inside shareholders have, 
since at least a portion of the information they collect is reflected in their trading patterns (Sias, 2004).  
Whilst the pecking order theory of capital structure decisions does not necessarily suggest that 
institutional holdings and financing mix decisions will have a positive relationship, the two variables can be 
inversely related as a result of information asymmetry and mispriced equity (Myers (1984). Here, firms may 
under‐invest in good yielding projects which will result in firms funding investments with financing sources 
that best minimize adverse selection costs. Hence, firms will choose retained earnings over risky debt and equity. 
Institutional investors ease the adverse selection costs of equity, to make equity financing comparatively 
cheaper; firms with high institutional holdings should have lower leverage than those with low institutional 
holdings. On the other hand, institutional holdings can have a positive impact of capital structure that firms may 
reject worthwhile projects based on the dilutive costs of issuing equity. As such, a multi‐period model will be 
constructed where firms optimally issue stock today, when information asymmetry is low, to avoid the potential 
loss of a positive NPV project in the future due to information asymmetry problems at that time (Viswanath, 
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1993). However, the dilutive cost of future equity narrows the information gap between managers and 
shareholders. As such, a strong institutional shareholder base may allow firms to avoid issuing equity today, 
implying a complementary relationship between institutional holdings and leverage (Michaely & Vincent, 2013) 
Another set of capital structure theorists posit that the level of conflicts of interests between managers 
and equity holders lead to a particular leverage ratio (Jensen, 1986). These conflicts are usually costly as they 
cause managers to overindulge in activities which will benefit only themselves since they bear the whole cost of 
abstaining from these activities whilst garnering only a fraction of the gains. Debt is proffered to alleviate this 
inefficiency as Jensen (1986) argues that debt is a moderating tool used to assuage shareholder manager agency 
conflicts by committing managers to pledge funds to repay creditors. As such, firms will increase their debt 
portfolio and reduce equity in order to lessen the amount of free cash available for empire building as well as 
tackle managerial inefficiencies. Nevertheless, Institutional investors can affect the viciousness of firms’ agency 
costs, because institutions engage in monitoring managers  ranging from  intervention in the company’s affairs to 
more aggressive techniques of shareholder activism, (Parrino, Sias, & Starks (2003); Gillan & Starks(2007); 
Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001)). The goal however is to reduce the conflicts of interest that exist between 
shareholders and managers, and in doing so, institutional investors can potentially influence capital structure 
decisions (Michelay &Vincent, 2013).   
Despite the fact that various models advocate that institutional investors mitigate shareholder‐manager 
agency conflict when determining financial mix decisions, the mode in which this is done remains evasive. Two 
strands of models exist in this context; institutional investors as substitutes or as outcomes (La Porta et al. 
(2000). As substitutes, institutions afford protection for investors while acting as substitutes for debts. Therefore 
if everything is equal, firms, with high level of institutional investors will require low debts and higher equity. 
With institutional investors as outcomes, for these investors to sufficiently affect the level of debts, ample 
mechanisms must be put in place, perhaps in the form of laws and regulations, and thereby limiting potential 
wealth expropriation. This implies that firms with high institutional investors will have more debt.  
 
2.2. Empirical Evidence 
Empirical literature centered on the link between institutional holdings and capital structure decisions are rather 
limited. Whilst the existing literature surroundings the nexus which assess the main characteristics of corporate 
governance such as board size, board composition, CEO duality  and CEO compensation , effects on firms 
leverage remain inconclusive.  
 
Board size and Capital Structure 
Abor (2007) analyzed the link between corporate governance and capital structure for listed firms on the Ghana 
Stock Exchange and find statistically significant relationship between board size, CEO duality and a higher 
percentage of non-executive directors and capital structure. The findings generally indicate that firms’ with CEO 
duality pursue higher debt policies since the CEO also acting as the director concentrates decision making. While 
a larger board size which is more entrenched as a result of superior monitoring may seek higher financial 
leverage to increase the value of the firm. Also, higher percentage of external directors may seek for higher 
leverage. In the same vein, Ganiyu & Abiodun (2012) who find that board size, board skills and CEO duality 
have significant impact in determining debt to equity ratio for the companies under survey in the food and 
beverage industry in Nigeria. They conclude that larger board sizes and higher profitability may make firms 
more prone to taking risk and seek external sources of finance for expansion and aggressive exploitation of 
investment opportunities. Elucidating that larger board sizes may weaken corporate governance practices as a 
product of conflicts emanating from the failure of the board to reach a consensus in decision making thereby 
leading to high leverage (Jensen,1986; Berger, et.al. 1997). Also, Abor et al (2008) find board skill and board 
size significantly positive to the leverage position of oil and gas firms in Nigeria. Agyei& Owusu (2014) explore 
the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure of listed manufacturing companies in the 
Ghanaian Stock Exchange. The study covered 8 firm level data for the sample period of 2007-2011. The results 
show that board size, board composition and ownership structure are positively correlated to the firms’ debt to 
equity ratio, which depicts the importance of corporate governance practices in capital structure mix. In a similar 
study by, Kajananthan (2012) six corporate governance mechanisms driving capital structure decisions were 
employed from 28 manufacturing firms listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange as a sample for the periods 2009-
2011 in a multivariate framework. The results show corporate governance practices influence a firm’s financing 
mix decisions.  
 In the same way, Chitiavi et al. (2013) investigated the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on 
leverage for 30 firms listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange for a span of 5 years (2007-2011). By employing 
board size, ownership concentration, institutional share ratio, board independence and CEO duality as proxies for 
corporate governance, the empirical analysis reveal that the firms under observation had larger board size and 
preferred internal financing. In addition, Uwigbe (2013), examines the impact of CEO duality and Board size on 
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capital structure amongst 40 randomly selected firms listed on the Nigeria stock exchange. The findings reveal a 
negative relationship between board size and capital structure and hence concludes that firms with smaller board 
sizes employ more amount of debt to lessen agency problem.  
Contrastingly, Ajanthan (2013) looked into the relationship between some specific characters of corporate 
governance (Board Size, CEO duality, Board Composition) capital structure and profitability of 18 listed Hotels 
and Restaurants companies in Colombo Stock Exchange. The findings show that none of the variables have 
significant relationship with capital structures. In addition, the study conducted by Rehman et al. (2013) looked 
into the link between the underlying nexus of 19 randomly selected banks in Pakistan using the multiple 
regression mode.  The results show no relationship between corporate governance and capital structure in the 
banking sector in Pakistan.  
 
Institutional Shareholdings and Capital Structure 
Hasan & Butt (2009) analyze the corporate governance and capital structure decision mix of 58 randomly listed 
companies in Pakistan. The study covers the period from 2002-2005. Using board size, board composition, CEO 
duality, and more specifically institutional shareholding, the findings suggest that corporate governance is 
necessary when making financing mix decision. Furthermore, the results find no significant relationship between 
institutional shareholding and capital structure explaining that most institutional shareholders in the sample are 
either handpicked nominees or are family representatives. Therefore for institutional shareholders to have 
effective control, their nomination should be random and independent.  
Al Najjar & Taylor (2004) explore the relationship between capital structure and ownership structure on 
Jordanian listed firms from 1994-2003 using both single equation and reduced equations for panel data. The 
findings reveal that assets tangibility, firm size and Business Risk are considered joint determinants of ownership 
structure and capital structure decisions. In the same vein, Dalvi & Mardanloo (2014) studied the effect of capital 
structure and ownership while controlling for conservatism using 50 conservative firms listed on the Tehran 
Stock Exchange. Using a multivariate regression model for panel data, the findings show that ownership 
structure is insignificant when firm determine their capital structure. 
More specifically is the work of Michaely & Vincent (2013) who empirically investigate the 
relationship between institutional shareholding and capital structure for firms. The study used data of all firm‐
year observations for U.S. incorporated firms in the CRSP–Compustat merged database between 1979 and 2009, 
excluding American Depositary Receipts, utility companies., Arrellano & Bond dynamic panel estimation, linear 
two‐stage least squares estimation and  S&P 500 treatment in two difference‐in‐differences estimations  
were employed to explore the nexus. They find a significant inverse relationship between institutional holdings 
leverage. In addition, firms lower their debt to equity ratio with an increase in institutional holdings as such they 
tend to issue more equity but not debt. While these findings are consistent with models in which institutions 
substitute for debt by monitoring and reducing information asymmetry problems, further evidence suggests that 
the effect on asymmetric information dominates.  
It is pertinent to note that the existing empirical literature on institutional holdings and capital structure 
decisions is limited and inconclusive. In light of the foregoing, this study hopes to add to exiting literature by 
providing empirical evidence on the contributions of Institutional shareholding in capital structure decisions. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data Description 
In an attempt at investigating the impact of  institutional investors on capital structure decisions, this study 
employed data extracted from the financial reports of non-financial firms (consumer goods) as made available in 
the Nigeria Stock Exchange Fact Book and the companies’ annual reports. The sample is made up of a total of 
19 consumer goods companies for a sample period 2009-2013.The choice of the sample time frame is based on 
the fact that the Code of Corporate Governance for public companies was reviewed in 2008. It is therefore 
expected that most listed firms will begin complying with the reviewed Code of Corporate Governance by 2009. 
The initial sample size for consumer goods firms as classified by the Nigeria Stock exchange was 27 (NSE fact 
book,2012/2013), but due to the unavailability of data for some listed firms for the period under consideration 
the sample size was reduced to 19 non-financial firms . 
 
3.2 Construction of variables  
In investigating the link between institutional shareholding and capital structure decisions, we construct our 
variables in line with existing theories and empirical research.  
Capital Structure is employed as the dependent variable. Capital Structure which is the choice of the long term 
financial mix of debt and equity was arrive at by dividing total debt by total equity as shown below( Ganiyu & 
Abiodun,2012; Kajananthan,2012;) 
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Board Size: board size represents the board of directors of the firms. They are at the top of any corporate set up 
and contribute significantly to strategic decision making such as capital structure mix. In this study, therefore, we 
employ the variable board size which is the total number of members on the board of directors measured in its 
logarithm form (Hasan& Butt, 2009; Ganiyu & Abiodun, 2012; Bodaghi & Ahmadpour; 2010) 
Institutional shareholdings this is measured as a percentage of the shares held by institutions as reported in the 
annual reports of the firms. The presence of institutional shareholders as equity share holders is said to change 
the method in which firms structure their capital. In the first instance, institutional shareholders provide a source 
of long term debts while enjoying strategic influence over the board. Also, they aid in lowering agency costs and 
lessen managerial opportunism by threats of exit and monitoring management which boost shareholders 
confidence and raises firm value. Hence, the higher the institutional shareholdings by firms, the higher the ratio 
of debt to equity (Ajathan, 2013; Hasan& Butt; 2009; Chivati et al. 2013; Agyei& Owosu, 2014) 
Firm size: We control for firm size as a variable that can affect the structure of a firms capital mix. As there are 
considerable evidence that the size of a firm plays an important role in the capital structure decision. Large firms 
tend to be more diversified and less susceptible to bankruptcy. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected 
between a firm's size and its leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Bhaduri, 2002). Bauer (2004) suggests that the 
natural log of total asset of the firm can be used to measure the firm’s size.  
Profitability: The study also control for profitability as a major determinant that can affect capital structure 
decisions when interacting with institutional shareholders. Although theoretical predictions surrounding the 
impact of firms’ profitability are inconsistent, its importance in determining capital structure cannot be 
overemphasized. From the trade- off theory, firms with higher profitability should have higher leverage which 
will be used as a shield against higher taxes. However, from the pecking order theory point of view, firms prefer 
internal financing to external therefore; more profitable companies may have lower need for external financing 
and therefore should have lower leverage. In this study, profitability is measured as earning per share since the 
firms are publicly traded companies. 
 
3.2 Model Specification 
This research work uses multivariate regression analysis in a panel data framework to empirically examine the 
interactions of institutional shareholding and capital structure of listed non-financial firms. The study adopts the 
panel data approach as it aids in exploring simultaneously the cross sectional as well as the time series aspects of 
the data.  
The model is developed from existing empirical research and augmented to meet the major objective of the 
study. It is specified below as: 
,= +  +  +  ! +%#$%+&,                             (1) 
Where CS = Capital Structure  
LNBZ = the natural log of board size 
FS = is the size of the firm 
PROF= Firms profitability 
INSH= Institutional Shareholding 
i denotes the different  companies in the sample (i = 1…19) and t denotes the time period (t = 2009…2013).	, 
Represents the parameter of the model to be estimated which may vary across firms '()	&, is the error term. 
  
3.4 Econometric Techniques 
The econometric technique used to analyze the coefficients in the study is determined by the Hausman test. The 
Hausman test, estimates the null hypothesis (H0) that the model is random effect (RE) against the alternative 
hypothesis (H1) that the model is fixed effect (FE) is tested. The underlying objective is to test if the error term is 
correlated with the regressors. The absence of such correlation may present the random effects model to be more 
powerful. The existence of correlation makes the random effects model inconsistent in estimation and the fixed 
effects model would be the choice model. The fixed effect model is preferred in the presence of correlation as it 
allows for cross sectional heterogeneity by letting the intercept differ across entities/individuals. It also tries to 
explain the causes of variation within individuals or entities If the p-value is greater than 0.05 (p>0.05) they are 
termed insignificant and the random effects model is used. However if the p-value is less than 0.05 the fixed 
effect estimator is significant and should be employed.  
The Hausman test in these analysis yields *! of 10.95 and p- value of 0.9135 which is insignificant at a 
5% s level, As such we fail to reject the null of a random effect model. More so, the random effect model is 
preferred in this study because the control variable the firms’ size is time invariant and if employed in the fixed 
effect model it will be absorbed. The Random effect model is used and is corrected for heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation using the robust standard errors. 
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4. Empirical Results 
Table 1    Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
BOARD SIZE 81 9.592593 3.216278 6 17 
FIRM SIZE 84 4.34E+07 1.636919 10.59863 19.67252 
CS 94 33.87234 25.3306 1 79 
INSH 74 53.51537 19.46704 10 75 
PROFITABILITY 72 15.83333 43.11498 -2 260 
 
     
Table 1 above reveals that the average size of the board of directors of our sample companies is 9.5 with the 
largest of 17 members and the minimum board size of 6 members. The average level of institutional holdings is 
approximately 53.5% with the minimum of 1% and a maximum of 75% which is fairly significant. Also, the 
average ratio of the firms’ capital mix is 33% which denotes the companies on an average are financed by 33.8% 
long term debt and 66.2% equity. 
Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
Variables CS FS LNBZ INST PROF 
CS 1.000     
FS 0.7208 1.000    
LNBZ 0.7086 0.6857 1.000   
INST 0.2532 0.1857 0.4428 1.000  
PROF 0.3922 0.4453 0.4725 0.1422 1.000 
The results of the correlation matrix from table 2 above indicate a positive relationship between 
institutional holdings and capital structure which may stem from the effect of monitoring management and 
agency reduction (Hassan & Butt, 2009). But this relationship is rather weak at 23%. There is also a positive 
relationship between the firms’ leverage (CS) and firms’ size.  This is logical as the presence of a large asset 
base is necessary for firms to borrow funds from commercial banks in Nigeria. Also, the size of the board from 
the analysis is found to be positively correlated with capital structure at 72%. Signifying that larger boards may 
exert demands on managers to pursue lower risk financing options which will lower cost of capital whilst 
maximizing shareholder wealth.  We find a positive relationship between capital structure and profitability which 
is line with the trade-off theory  
Table 3 below presents the result of the multivariate analysis in a panel framework. The analysis show 
that a 1% increase in profitability will lead to a 0.8% point increase in capital structure and it is significant at 
+=0.01. The results have economic implication and are in line with the trade-off theory that predicts that 
profitable firms will have high debt servicing capacity and more taxable income to shield and therefore should 
have higher debt to equity ratio (Petersen and Rajan, (1994). 
Similarly, the analysis presents evidence that debt to equity ratio is significantly affected by the size of 
the firm. Thus an increase in firm size invariably leads to a 6.08% point increase in capital structure. Therefore, 
larger firm represents larger assets base and the ability to withstand financial pressure in the case of bankruptcy. 
The size of the board is also a major determinant of a firm’s financing mix decisions. This implies that 
these large boards will pursue a policy of higher leverage to improve the values of their firms’ value which is 
more entrenched as a result of monitoring by regulatory authorities and institutional shareholders (Wen, (2000); 
Anderson, (2004)). While a larger board  
Furthermore, the contribution of institutional investors to capital structure decisions is a positive one. 
As a change in institutional shareholding base leads to an increase in debt to equity ratio. Hence the higher the 
level of institution shareholders a firm has, the more likely the firm will borrow more. As such, institutional 
investors have a complementary relationship with leverage. But this finding is not statistically significant 
possible; explanation may be that the institutional shareholders base is not strong enough to mount pressure on 
mangers or threaten to exit when managers assume empire building or due to operational efficiencies. More so, 
Hasan & Butt (2009) explain that it is because most institutional shareholders are often family members or 
handpicked nominees as such their effect as corporate governance mechanisms are hardly felt.  
The power of model is explained by R, which shows the overall influence of independent variables on 
the dependent variables. In our results, it states that 55% of dependent variable is influenced by independent 
variables.   More so,   the P value and the F statistics is also less than 5% which depicts strong relationship 
between the variables. 
The estimated model can therefore be expressed as follows; 
,=−102.76 + 14.98399 + 6.083 + 0.082  	 + 0.09051%#$+&,   (3) 
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The Effect of Institutional Shareholding on Capital Structure 
 Dependent variable: Capital structure 
Variables  Coefficient Std. Error   Z Stats. P>(Z) 
LNBZ 14.98399 7.947168 1.79 0.074* 
FS 6.083425 1.57636 3.86 0.000*** 
PROF 0.0818295 0.0341462 2.69 0.007*** 
INST .0905119 0.1996949 0.45 0.650 
CONSTANT -102.7647 26.31519 -3.88 0.000 
Wald chi2(4)        28.72   
Prob> chi              0.000   
R2  within              1.945   
R2    between        0.5562  
R2  overall             0.5250 
Note (*,**,***) denotes significance level at 10%,5% and 1% respectively 
          Source: Stata output 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper empirically examines the relationship between board size, institutional holdings and capital structure 
for 19 non-financial listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The study used a five year time frame 2009-2013, 
taking into consideration the reinforcing of the Code of Corporate Governance in 2008. Results reveal that, 
representations of institutional holdings have a positive but insignificant relationship on capital structure 
decisions. This goes to show that institutional investors acts as complements as with the agency theory 
predictions but not significant because there is no adequate monitoring by this group. On the other hand the 
study finds that board size contribute significantly in determining capital structure as larger board sizes lead to 
higher debt to equity ratio. 
The traditional determinants of capital structure like firm size and profitability were found to be statistically 
significant. Profitability is positively related to capital structure which is line with trade-off theory. Furthermore, 
larger firms denote larger assets bases and thus the ability to withstand financial pressure and bankruptcy. Also, 
large firms can arrange debt financing due to long term relationship and better collateral offering. As such we 
conclude institutional investors contribute to capital structure decisions but this base is not strong enough to 
make any major impact. 
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